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[S. F. No. 17120. In Bank. Aug. 1,1946.] 
GEORGE DURHAM ROBINSON et al., Appellants, "'. 
VER.A PULS, as Administratrix, etc., Respondent. 
[1] Jury-Bight to Jury Trial.-Where legal and equitable issues 
are joined in the same action. the parties are entitled to a 
jury trial on the legal issues. 
[2] Id.-Waiver of Jury Trial-Failure to Demand.-A party may 
not properly b(> denied a jury trial beeause his demand there-
for does not specify the issues to be tried by jury. The fact 
that both legal and equitable issues are involved does Dot 
alter the rule. (Disapproving of Meek v. De LAtou",2 Cal.App. 
261,83 P. 300; and Whittie,. v • .Atdh, 99 Cal.App. 759,279 P. 
491.) 
[8] Id.-Waiver of Jury Trial-Failure to Deposit Fees.-A party 
. who has been denied a jury trial is Dot thereafter required 
to deposit jury fees at the time prescribed by Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 631. subd. 5. 
duly allthor1Z8d employees of the Company ahall be allowed to connect, 
disconnect, move, change. or alter in any manner, any or all such iDBtr-u-
mentalities and equipmeJIt. 
"No appa.ratlll or appliance not provided or authorized by the Com-
pany shall Ix- attached to or used in connection with telephone equipment 
and facilities provided by the Company. 
"The subscriber will be held responsible for 1088 of or damage to any 
equipment or appa.ratll8 furnished by the Company, WeBS such 1088 or 
damage is dut' to eaUge~ beyona hit! control." 
[1] See 15 OaLJur. 336; 31 Am.Jur. 572. 
HeK. Dig. References: [1] J1117, § 15; [2] Jury, i 21; [3] Jury, 
122; [4, 6] Evidence, 1315. 
) 
) 
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ltl Evidence-Documentary Evidence-Boots of Account.-Wbere 
the person who made a book entry is dead, evidence that the 
books of account were in his handwriting, and that they were 
kept correctly. is sufficient foundation for their admission. 
The statutory presumptions that "a writing is truly dllted" 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1963(23»), and that .. the ordinary course 
of business has been followed" (Code Civ. Proc., § 1963(20», 
obviate the necessity for any additional showin/l as to the 
contemporaneouB nature of the entry. 
(6) ld. - Documentary Evidence - Books of Aecount.-Code Civ. 
Proc., § 1946, subd. 1, which expressly permits the admission 
in evidence of writings of a decedent when made ag&inst 
interest, states a separate and distinct exception to the bear-
Bay rule, and does not restrict the application of the rule 
~vernin/l the admission in evidence of book account!' 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Al&-
meda County. Frank M. Ogden, Judge. Reversed. 
Action for declaratory and other relief, in which defendant 
filed a cross-complaint for a money judgment. Judgment for 
defendant reversed. 
William Berger and Abraham Setzer for Appellants. 
James R. Agee, Breed, Burpee & Robinson and Lester Perry' 
for Respondent. 
GIBSON, C. J.-This action was brought for declaratory 
relief, for cancellation of two promissory notes, and for an 
accounting if a trust were found to exist, or, in the alternative, 
for a money judgment. Defendant filed a cross-complaint, 
seeking a money judgment on two book accounts. Plaintiffs' 
demand for a jury trial was refused, and after trial by the 
court without a jury judgment was entered against plaintiffs 
on their complaint and for defendant on her cross-complaint. 
Plaintiffs contend on this appeal that the court erred in 
denying them a jury trial. 
[1] The issues raised by the comph.t.int were both equi-
table and legal in nature and those raised by the cross-com-
plaint were solely legal in character. It is settled in this state 
that where legal and equitable issues are joined in the same 
[4] Death of adverse party as affecting evidence with respect 
to book aocount, DOte, 8 A.L.B. 756. See, also, 20 Am.Jur. 929. 
) 
) 
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action the parties are entitled to a jury trial on the legal 
issues. (OonneU v. Bowes, 19 Ca1.2d 870 [122 P.2d 456]; 
Crouser v. Boice, 51 Cal.App.2d 198 [124 P.2d 358]; Hutch.-
Mon v. Marks, 54 Cal.App. 2d 113 [128 P.2d 573].) 
[a] It is argued, however, that plainti1Is' demand for a 
jury trial was defective in that it failed to specify the legal 
issues to be tried by the jury. Defendant relies on Meek v. 
De Latour, 2 Cal.App. 261 [83 P. 300], and Whittier v. Auth, . 
99 Cal.App. 759 [279 P. 491], which hold that it is not error to 
refuse a general demand for a jury to try a cause consisting 
of legal and equitable issues. These decisions are based on 
eases from other jurisdictions and are in con1lict with our 
constitutional and statutory provisions relative to waiver of 
jury trial. They are therefore disapproved. 
This court held, in People v. Metropolitan Surety 00., 164 
Ca1. 174, at page 177 [128 P. 324, Ann.Cas. 1914B 1181], 
that under article I, section 7, of the state Constitution "The 
legislature is . • • given the sole power of declaring what 
shall constitute a waiver of trial by jury . . . and has exer-
cised its power by the enactment of section 631 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure- ... [and] ... a jury may be waived only 
in one of the ••• modes prescribed by this section." No-
where in section 631 is it provided that a jury is waived by 
·"Trial by jury may be waived by the leveral parties to an issue of 
fact in manner following: 
"I. By failing to appear at the trial; 
"2. By written consent filed with the clerk or justlee; 
"3. By oral consent, in open court, entered in the minutes or docket; 
"4. FailUf'e to demand jury. By failing to announce that a jury 
is required, at the time the cause is first set upon the trial calendar if it 
be set upon notice or stipulation! or within five days after notice of 
letting if it be II8t without notice or stipulation; provided, that in 
justices' courts suClh 1f&.iver may be made by failure of either party to 
demand a jury within two days after service upon him of the notice pro-
vided for in Section 594 of this code; provided further, that in any su-
perior court action if a jury is demanded by either party in the memoran-
dum to set cause for trial and suClh party thereafter by announcement or 
by operation of law 1f&.ives a trial by jury, then in laid event any and 
all adverse party or farties shall be given 10 days' written notice by the 
clerk of the court 0 such waiver, whereupon, notwithstanding any rule 
of the court to the contrary, suClh adverse party or ~ies shall have not 
exceeding five days immediately following the rece1pt of IUCIh notice of 
waiver, within which to file and lerve a demand for a trial by jury and 
deposit advance jury fees for the first day's trial whenever such deposit 
is required by rule of court, and if it is impossible for the clerk of the 
court to give such 10 days' notice by rea.son of the trial date, or if for 
any cause said notice is not given, the trial of laid action shall be con-
tinued by the court for a sufficient length of time to enable the giving 
of suClh notice by the clerk of the court to suClh adverse party. 
"BeprdleIa of uythiDe .. tabled ill tile forecomc to the oeatr&17. 
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failure to specify in the demand the issues to be tried by jury, 
and the trial court could not, therefore, properly deny plain-
tiffs a jury trial for the reason that the demand did not so 
specify. The fact that both legal and equitable issues were 
involved does not alter the rule. 
[S] Defendant also contends that plaintiffs waived a jury 
by reason of their failure to deposit jury fees 10 days prior 
to the day set for trial, as required by subdivision 5 of sec-
tion 631. The order denying plaintiffs' demtand for a jury 
was made more than 45 days prior to the date set for trial. 
Plaintiffs having been refused a jury were not thereafter re-
quired to deposit fees for a jury trial which had been denied 
them. The law does not require the performance of an idle 
act. (Civ. Code, § 3532.) 
The court therefore erred in denying plaintiffs a jury 
trial upon the legal issues and they are entitled to a reversal 
of the judgment, at least in so far as it disposes of issues that 
should have been submitted to a jury. It is impracticable on 
this appeal to separate the legal from the equitable issues, 
and there is some doubt as to the propriety of the refusal 
of the court to permit plaintiffs to offer evidence on the ques-
tion of the authenticity of a receipt which was material on 
the trial of the equitable issues. The entire judgment should 
therefore be reversed in order to permit a full and proper 
consideration on a single trial of all the issues (see ConnelZ v. 
Bowes, 19 Cal.2d 870, 872 f122 P.2d 456], outlining proper 
procedure in such cases). 
A question arose during the trial as to the admissibility in 
evidence of certain books of account and, inasmuch as the 
the court may in ita discretion, upon such terms 88 may be juat allow a 
trial by jury to be had, although there baa been a waiver of lIIlclt a trial 
":;. Failure '0 make deporit. By failing to deE0sit with the clerk, 
or juatice, a sum equal to the amount of one day 8 jury fees payable, 
under the law, as provided herein. In juatices' courts such deposit muat 
be made two days prior to the date Bet for trial or prior to the date to 
which the trial has been postponed because of the demand for a jury 
trial; in other courts such deposit must be made 10 days prior to the 
uate set for trial. 
"6. By failing to deposit with the clerk or Justice, promptly after 
the impanelment of the jury, a sum equal to the mileage or transportation 
(if any be allowed by law) of the jury accrued up to that time; 
"7. By failing to deposit with the clerk or luatice, at the beginDing 
of the second and each succeeding day'8 lI88S1on a sum equal to one 
dav's fees of the jury, and the mileage or transportation, if any there be. 
t.J""" dupitfl _tvflf'. The court may, in its discretion upon lIIlch 
terms as may be just, allow a trial by jury to be had although there baa 
MaR a waiter of .... triaL .. 
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court will undoubtedly be confronted with the same question 
on retrial, we will consider the contentions of the parties with 
respect thereto. The books in question were kept by PuIs 
and were offered in evidence by the administratrix in support 
of her cross-complaint for a money judgment. Certain of 
these books (Exhibits A, B, C and D) were kept by Puls in 
connection with a gasoline service station operated by him, 
and re1lected transactions with his customers, including plain-
tiff, George Robinson. A. second set of books kept by PuIs 
(Exhibits M and N) covered financial transactions between 
Puls and Robinson with respect to a fruit growing and dry-
ing business in which the latter was engaged. All of these 
books were admitted in evidence over plaintiffs' objection 
that there was no showing that the entries were made within 
reasonable proximity to the time of the respective transac-
tions as required by the Uniform Business Records as Evi-
dence Act (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1953e-1953h). 
Both sets of books were identified as those kept by PuIs 
during the years in question; they were in his handwriting 
and they were shown to have been kept in an orderly manner. 
The dates of the entries in the books appear to correspond 
reasonably with the dates of the original events. 
[4] Where the person who made the entry is dead, evi-
dence that the books of account were in his handwriting, and 
that they were kept correctly, is sufficient foundation for 
their admission. (O'Neill v. O'Neill, 45 Cal.App. 772, 774 
[188 P. 603] j see, also, Foster v. Wehr, 114 Pa.Super. 101 
[173 A. 712]; G. S. Wood Mercantile Co. v. DougaU, 100 
Utah 267 [114 P.2d 202]; Burton v. Phillips, 161 Ala. 664 
[49 So. 848]; Leighton v. Manson, 14 Me. 208; Davie v. Lloyd, 
38 Colo. 250 [88 P. 446, 12 Ann.Cas. 75]; Dodge v. Mor.e, 
3 N.H. 232; Cram v. Spear, 8 Ohio 494; In re Greenwood', 
Estate, 201 Mo.App. 39 [208 S.W. 635, 637]; 52 L.R.A. 558; 
1 Elliott on Evidence, § 465; 2 Ency. of Evidence, pp. 610-
611; 10 R.CL. 1175; 32 C.J.S. 557; 20 Am.Jur. 929.) Hore-
over, the statutory presumptions that "a writing is truly 
dated" (Code Civ. Proc., § 1963(23», and that "the ordinary 
course of business has been followed" (Code Civ. Proe., 
§ 1963 (20» obviate the necessity for any additional showing 
as to the contemporaneous nature of the entry. 
[6] Plaintiffs, citing section 1946, subdivision 1, of the 
Code of Civil Procedure, contend that the books were not 
admissible in evidence because the entries were not adverse 
. < 
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to the decedent. This section, which expressly permits the 
admission in evidence of writings of a decedent when made 
against interest, state8 a separate and distinct exception to 
the hearsay evidence rule. (Radtke v. Taylor, 105 Ore. 559 
[210 P. 863, 870, 27 A.L.R. 1423]; see, also, 1 Elliott on Evi-
dence. § 477; 5 Wigmore on Evidence, § 1518.) It does not, 
however, in any way restrict the application of the rule gov-
erning the admis.<don in evidence of book accounts. 
The further contention is made that the books (Ex-
hibits M and N) containing records of deposits and loans 
made in connection with the fruit growing business constitute 
private memoranda and, therefore, are not admissible. These 
books were kept by PuIs pursuant to an agreement with Rob-
inson, and an expert accountant testified that the entrieA 
appearing therein, with minor exceptions, covered transac-
tions reflected by original vouchers and drafts. The objec-
tion that these books are private memoranda was not made in 
the trial court. It appears that the original documents evi-
dencing most of the transactions are available and it may not 
be necessary to use the books to prove the account. The de-
fendant, however, is now Informed of plaintiffs' contention 
and if she desires to offer the books at a second trial she will 
have an opportunity to establish their character in laying 
a foundation for their admission in evidence. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spen~ J., eonc~ 
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur in the judgment. I cannot agree, 
however, with that part of the majority opinion holding that 
the store books and the two other books reflecting the financial 
transactions between PuIs and the plaintiff are admissible in 
evidence in absence of proof that the entries on which defend-
ants rely were made at or near the time of the transactions 
in question. Section 1953f of the Code of Civil Procedure, 
enacted in this state in 1941 as part of the Uniform Business 
Records as Evidence Act provides: "A record of an act, con-
dition of event shall, in so far as relevant, be competent evi-
dence if the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to 
its identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it was 
made in the regular course of business, at or near the time of 
the act, condition or .vent, and if, in the opinion of the court, 
670 RoBINSON tI. PULB [280.2<1 
the sources of information, method and time of preparation 
were such as to justify its admission." (Italics added.) This 
statute not only requires preliminary proof in aU cases that 
the record was made "at or near the time" of the transac-
tion, it also vests in the trial court authority to determine, 
before such records are admitted in evidence, whether the 
time of its preparation was near enough to the transactions 
to be proved to justify the admission of the record. The uni-
form act was formulated after years of discussion (see 5 Wig-
more, Evidence (3d ed.) 362) and its draftsmen undoubt-
edly weighed the disadvantage of the rule to estates against 
the dangers of admitting records whose trustworthiness was 
not established, when they did not deem it advisable to relax 
the requirements of preliminary proof in the case of the books 
of a decedent. (See Barrow, Business Entries Before the 
Court, 32 ID.L.Rev. 334; 5 Wigmore, Evidence (3d Ed.) 363.) 
In abandoning the requirement of proof that the record 
W&Ii made at or near the time of the transaction, if the person 
who made it is dead, the majority opinion opens the door for 
the admission of records that might be made at a time so 
remote from their occurrence as to laek trustworthiness. The 
justification for admitting records as evidence is that they 
can be regarded as trustworthy when they have been prepared 
in the ordinary course of business and at or near the time 
of the transaction. (Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 115 
[63 P. 477, 87 L.Ed. 645, 144 A.L.R. 719]; same case 129 
F.2d 976, 982; Roge v. Valentine, 280 N.Y. 268 [20 N.E.2d 
751, 755].) "The entry should have been made at or near 
the time of the transaction recorded,-not merely because 
this is necessary in order to assure a fairly accurate recollec-
tion of the matter, but because any trustworthy habit of mak-
ing regular busine.'lS records will involve the making of the 
record contemporaneously." (5 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.) 
375.) "This is another circumstance very properly required 
as tending to accuracy, and is similar to the requirement ..• 
as to entries by deceased persons." (5 Wigmore, Evidence 
(3d ed.) 405.) There is particular need of such proof when 
the entries of a deceased person are presented and there is 
no opportunity to examine those in whose favor the entries 
speak. .Any doubt as to the requirement of such proof is dis-
pelled by section 1946 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which 
relates specifically to the entries and other writings of a dece-
dent: "The entries and other writings of a decedent, made 
/ 
! 
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at or "ear the hme of the transaction, and in a position to 
know the faets stated therein, may be read as prima faeie 
evidence of the facts stated therein, in the following eases. 
• • ." (Italics added.) Thus both section 1946 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure and the Uniform BusinesA Records as 
Evidence Aet require proof that the entry was made at or 
near the time of the transaction, and t.here is no reason for 
construing them differently. 
The eases cited in the majority opinion relate to the shop· 
book rule of the common law rather than to the uniform act. 
Under the common law the two books in the present ease 
(Exhibits M and N), which were not store books but book!; 
reflecting the financial transactions between Puls and plain-
tiff, would not have been admissible to show the alleged 
loans by Puls, for account books were inadmissible to show 
transactions concerning the paying or lending of money. 
(Collin v. Card, 2 Cal. 421; Yic1c Wo v. Underhill, 5 Ca1.App. 
519 [90 P. 967]; Bee Le Prane v. Hewitt, 7 Cal. 186; 84 A.L.R. 
147. ]48: n Wigmore. Evidence (3d eel.) 39f}.) 
. Respondent'. petition for a rehearing was denied Aug. 29, 
1946. 
